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ESSAY 
DEAD AGAIN:  THE LATEST DEMISE 
OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Michael D. Cicchini*
 
 
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court abandoned its Roberts 
“reliability” approach to the right of confrontation.  The Court conceded 
that the Roberts decision had killed the Confrontation Clause by:  (1) 
impermissibly tying the right of confrontation to the rule against hearsay; 
(2) inappropriately allowing pretrial determinations of reliability to replace 
actual cross-examination at trial; (3) relying too heavily on malleable, 
multi-factor balancing tests; and (4) completely failing to constrain judicial 
discretion.  Since Crawford, however, the Court has decided Davis v. 
Washington and Michigan v. Bryant.  Unfortunately, in the course of 
deciding those cases the Court has once again killed the Confrontation 
Clause.  More specifically, the Court has developed yet another framework 
that incorporates every single one of Roberts’s flaws, including its failure 
to constrain judicial discretion.  This Essay exposes the underlying reasons 
for the Court’s failure, offers a solution to the problem, and provides 
suggestions for the Court when deciding future cases that involve the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION:  DEAD AND DEAD AGAIN 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees, quite simply 
and clearly, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”1  This right to 
cross-examine one’s accuser is so basic to our fundamental sense of fairness 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has called it a “bedrock procedural 
guarantee.”2
But despite its simplicity and clarity, the Confrontation Clause has been 
the subject of thousands of articles and court opinions, each debating or 
deciding its proper reach and scope in every imaginable circumstance.
  Furthermore, its importance is easily understood.  Few among 
us would have confidence in the typical criminal conviction unless, at a 
bare minimum, the accuser appeared at trial, took an oath (or made an 
affirmation) to tell the truth, and was cross-examined about his biases, 
motives, and ability to accurately recall the events about which he testified. 
3  
And although law reviews and courts continue to publish these articles and 
opinions, the Confrontation Clause, for all practical purposes, died in 1980 
with the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts.4
In Roberts, the Court held that a prosecutor could use hearsay evidence at 
trial to convict a defendant if a judge, using a multi-factor balancing test, 
first found the hearsay to be reliable.
 
5  For reasons explained later in this 
Essay, this highly subjective, fact-intensive, malleable standard “fail[ed] to 
provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations.”6
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
  
Prosecutors, with the blessing of trial judges, routinely ran roughshod over 
defendants’ rights and often won convictions based primarily, if not 
entirely, on untested hearsay allegations.  The Confrontation Clause was 
dead. 
 2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 3. For a broad sampling of relevant cases, articles, and other commentary, see Richard 
D. Friedman, CONFRONTATION BLOG, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2011). 
 4. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 5. See id. at 66. 
 6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
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In 2004, however, the Court decided Crawford v. Washington7 and 
(temporarily) breathed new life into the Confrontation Clause.  In 
Crawford, the Court conceded that it had been misinterpreting the 
Constitution for the past twenty-five years, in part because it had allowed 
trial judges to use multi-factor balancing tests and their own judgments 
about reliability to replace actual cross-examination at trial.8  While the 
Court’s admission was of little consolation to the many thousands of 
individuals who had been convicted and imprisoned (or worse) based on 
hearsay they could not cross-examine, it was a welcome concession 
nonetheless.  In fact, many hailed Crawford as a great “sea change” in 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.9
But the more things changed, the more they stayed the same.  Despite the 
Court’s mea culpa, Crawford failed to cure the numerous ills of Roberts, 
and instead created a new standard that classified hearsay as either 
testimonial or nontestimonial.
  A new day, it seemed, was dawning. 
10  If, and only if, the hearsay was testimonial, 
the Confrontation Clause banned its use at trial; otherwise, a prosecutor 
could use the nontestimonial hearsay as he wished.11  But what exactly is 
this newly created concept—testimonial hearsay—on which the 
Constitution’s “bedrock procedural guarantee” now turns?12  The Court’s 
answer:  “We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of ‘testimonial.’”13
After Crawford, over the course of seven years and two cases—first 
Davis v. Washington
 
14 in 2006 and then Michigan v. Bryant15 in 2011—the 
Court attempted to put some meat on the bones of its revamped 
Confrontation Clause.16
 
 7. Id. at 36. 
  But instead of resuscitating it as many had hoped, 
 8. See id. at 67 (“But we view this as one of those rare cases in which the result below 
is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our part to interpret the Constitution 
in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion.”). 
 9. See, e.g., State v. Grace, 111 P.3d 28, 36 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (“Effecting a sea 
change in our understanding of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause . . . .”); Chris Hutton, Sir Walter 
Raleigh Revived:  The Supreme Court Re-vamps Two Decades of Confrontation Clause 
Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 61 (2005) (“This is a sea change 
for prosecution of cases involving child witnesses.”); Andrew King-Ries, State v. Mizenko:  
The Montana Supreme Court Wades into the Post-Crawford Waters, 67 MONT. L. REV. 275, 
313 (2006) (“Mizenko, therefore, recognizes Crawford’s sea-change in confrontation 
rights . . . .”). 
 10. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
 11. See id. at 68. 
 12. Testimonial hearsay was, indeed, a newly created concept. See id. at 71–72 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“Starting with Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation as a 
Circuit Justice in 1807 . . . through today, we have never drawn a distinction between 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements.  And for that matter, neither has any other court 
of which I am aware.” (citations omitted)). 
 13. Id. at 68 (majority opinion). 
 14. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 15. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 16. The Court has issued other post-Crawford opinions on the Confrontation Clause, but 
none that are relevant to the issue addressed in this Essay. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (addressing a defendant’s right to cross-examine the 
particular analyst that created the forensic laboratory report being used by the state); 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (addressing whether a forensic 
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the Court slowly and painfully developed yet another highly subjective, 
fact-intensive, malleable standard—the very thing it condemned in 
Crawford.17
The purpose of this Essay is not to make sense of a defendant’s 
confrontation rights in this Crawford-Davis-Bryant world; that is not 
possible.  Law professor Daniel Blinka accurately describes the Court’s 
most recent case, Bryant, as “a train wreck,” and sympathizes that “[f]or the 
defense lawyers and prosecutors who must eat this mush . . . every day, you 
have my best wishes and these words of solace.”
  This, unfortunately, is the current state of Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence under Crawford-Davis-Bryant.  The Confrontation 
Clause is dead again. 
18  Similarly, law professor 
Richard Friedman describes Bryant as “remarkably mushy, unjustified by 
any sound reasoning and virtually incoherent.”19  Likewise, Justice Scalia 
acknowledges in his Bryant dissent that the Court “distorts our 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.”20
Rather, the purpose of this Essay is two-fold.  First, I will demonstrate 
precisely how the Court has once again killed the Confrontation Clause, this 
time with its Crawford-Davis-Bryant triumvirate of cases.
 
21
 
laboratory report is testimonial); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (addressing when a 
defendant’s actions constitute a forfeiture of the right of confrontation).  The Court has also 
granted certiorari in People v. Williams to address whether the state can introduce a forensic 
laboratory report not for the truth of the matter asserted, but ostensibly to show the basis for 
the testifying expert’s opinion. 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 
(2011).  
  My hope is 
that exposing the underlying mechanics of this debacle will prevent a 
similar demise of other constitutional rights in the future.  Second, I will 
also demonstrate that these Confrontation Clause decisions are not worthy 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. Daniel D. Blinka, More “Bullcoming”?  The Court Courts Confusion in 
Confrontation, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2011), http://law.marquette.edu/
facultyblog/2011/03/03/more-“bullcoming”-the-court-courts-confusion-in-confrontation/. 
 19. Richard D. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, 
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
2011/03/preliminary-thoughts-on-bryant-decision.html. 
 20. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia should have 
foreseen this when he authored the Crawford decision in 2004, but better late than never.  
His hindsight criticism, although untimely and far from novel, is accurate. 
 21. Interestingly, the Court seems to provide greater protection for defendants when the 
state’s proffered hearsay takes the form of a forensic laboratory report created by a scientist, 
as opposed to a hearsay statement created and repeated by a police officer. See Bullcoming, 
131 S. Ct. at 2710 (holding that the defendant has the right to cross-examine the particular 
analyst that actually conducted the test); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (holding that a 
forensic laboratory report is testimonial evidence).  However, this is of little consolation for 
three reasons.  First, forensic laboratory reports are relatively uncommon when compared to 
the hearsay evidence addressed in this Essay.  Second, forensic laboratory reports produced 
by scientists, while far from error-free, are hardly “the principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.  And third, the right to 
confront the particular scientist that drafted the forensic laboratory report has little or no 
practical value to defendants, considering the “likely futility of cross-examining an analyst 
who likely had no recollection of this test among the hundreds of those routinely 
performed.” Daniel D. Blinka, Bullcoming Arrives, But Where’s the Path?, MARQ. U. L. 
SCHOOL FAC. BLOG (June 25, 2011), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/06/25/
bullcoming-arrives-but-wheres-the-path/. 
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of respect, but rather of criticism.  My hope in this regard is that individual 
states will, under their state constitutions, provide a genuine right of 
confrontation that exceeds the Court’s “hollow constitutional guarantee.”22
I.  CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON:  THE COURT COMES CLEAN 
 
In 1980, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts killed the 
Confrontation Clause by permitting a prosecutor nearly unrestricted use of 
hearsay accusations at trial, thereby completely eviscerating the defendant’s 
right to confront his accuser.23  The only prerequisites for introduction of 
the hearsay evidence were that the hearsay declarant be unavailable for 
trial24—if he were available, he would have to be called to the witness stand 
for live testimony—and that the judge find that the hearsay carried adequate 
“indicia of reliability.”25  This reliability test was satisfied in one of two 
ways.  If the hearsay fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” 
nothing more need be done; it was deemed reliable and therefore 
admissible.26  Or, if after analyzing all of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the hearsay, the judge believed the hearsay carried 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” it too was deemed reliable 
and therefore admissible.27
This second, disjunctive prong—simply called the reliability test or the 
reliability determination—was often couched in the formality of a factor-
laden framework.  State courts, left to their own devices, would develop 
multi-factor balancing tests to decide whether a hearsay statement was 
reliable, and therefore admissible.
 
28
(1) whether the declarant had an apparent motive to lie; (2) whether the 
general character of the declarant suggests trustworthiness; (3) whether 
more than one person heard the statements; (4) whether the statements 
were made spontaneously; (5) whether the timing of the statements and 
the relationship between the declarant and the witness suggest 
trustworthiness; (6) whether the statements contained express assertions 
of past fact; (7) whether cross-examination could not help to show the 
declarant’s lack of knowledge; (8) whether the possibility of the 
declarant’s recollection being faulty is remote; and (9) whether the 
  Virtually any factor was fair game for 
consideration.  For example, one state’s reliability determination depended 
on 
 
 22. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 23. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  Roberts perhaps seemed reasonable at the 
time in light of the particular facts before the Court; that is, the Court permitted the 
prosecutor to use a transcript of the defendant’s witness from the preliminary hearing when 
the witness became unavailable at trial. Id. at 58–59, 77.  It was the way that Roberts was 
broadly applied—or perhaps misapplied—thereafter that was most problematic. 
 24. See id. at 65. 
 25. Id. at 66 (citation omitted). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–66 (2004). 
1306 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
circumstances surrounding the statements give no reason to suppose that 
the declarant misrepresented the defendant’s involvement.29
Regardless of the particular phrasing of the test, the end result was 
usually the same:  the judge would find the hearsay reliable, thus allowing 
the prosecutor to introduce it at trial and leaving the defendant without any 
opportunity to cross-examine his accuser.
 
30  But then, in 2004, the Supreme 
Court decided Crawford and adeptly highlighted the numerous and serious 
problems with this nearly twenty-five-year-old reliability test.31
A.  Roberts Intermingled the Constitution with the Rules of Evidence 
  By 
identifying these problems and bringing them to the forefront, the Court 
seemed well on its way to implementing the long awaited “sea change” and 
resuscitating the Confrontation Clause.  The following sections address the 
fundamental defects that the Crawford Court identified. 
The first problem with Roberts was that it intermingled the Confrontation 
Clause with the rules of evidence—more specifically, the rule against 
hearsay and its thirty or so exceptions.  The Court in Crawford rejected the 
ideas that the right of confrontation should be synonymous with hearsay 
rules or should vary depending upon “‘the law of Evidence for the time 
being.’”32  That is, “[l]eaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to 
the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to 
prevent even the most flagrant” confrontation violations.33  The Court 
doubted that “the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s 
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence.”34
B.  Roberts Used Pretrial Judicial Determinations of Reliability 
as a Substitute for Actual Cross-Examination 
  Instead, the 
Confrontation Clause offers protection that is separate and distinct from the 
rules of evidence. 
The second problem with Roberts was that it permitted the prosecutor to 
use untested hearsay to convict a defendant if the judge first conducted a 
hearing and found that, in his opinion, the hearsay was reliable.  The Court 
in Crawford decried this approach as fundamentally flawed:  “Dispensing 
with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
 
 29. State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 425 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).  For an equally vague yet 
noticeably different set of factors, see Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 197–98 (Colo. 2002) 
(en banc), which relied upon the nature and character of the hearsay, as well as the 
circumstances under which the hearsay was made, in determining reliability. 
 30. Even the most unreliable type of hearsay—a self-serving accusation by a 
codefendant against a defendant—was admitted by lower courts “more than one-third of the 
time,” despite the Supreme Court’s warning “that it was ‘highly unlikely’ that accomplice 
confessions implicating the accused could survive Roberts.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–64.  
Other hearsay, of course, is admitted into evidence with far greater frequency. 
 31. See id. at 62–65. 
 32. Id. at 51 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 61. 
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dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is 
not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”35  More precisely, the 
Confrontation Clause commands “not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner:  by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination.”36
C.  Roberts’s Multi-factor Balancing Test Produced Wildly Unpredictable 
and Inconsistent Results 
  Accordingly, the protections of the Confrontation 
Clause must not hinge on pretrial judicial determinations of reliability. 
The third problem with Roberts was that its results—whether analyzing 
cases on an inter-state basis, an intra-state basis, or even an intra-court 
basis—were wildly unpredictable and inconsistent.  The cause of this 
problem was that “[t]here [were] countless factors bearing on whether a 
statement is reliable” and, to make matters worse, “[s]ome courts [wound] 
up attaching the same significance to opposite facts.”37  While this will be 
demonstrated in greater detail in Part III.B, two brief examples will quickly 
illustrate this point.  First, some courts would find a hearsay statement 
reliable, and therefore admissible, because it was detailed,38 while other 
courts would find a hearsay statement reliable, and therefore admissible, 
because it was not detailed.39  Second, some courts would find a hearsay 
statement reliable, and therefore admissible, because the declarant was in 
custody and accused of his own crime at the time he made the statement,40 
while other courts would find a hearsay statement reliable, and therefore 
admissible, because the declarant was not in custody and was not accused 
of a crime.41
D.  Roberts Completely Failed to Constrain Judicial Discretion 
  This inconsistency and unpredictability is not acceptable for a 
fundamental constitutional guarantee.   
The fourth problem with Roberts is the largest and most critical of its 
flaws:  the reliability test “reveals a fundamental failure on [the Court’s] 
part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended 
constraint on judicial discretion.”42
 
 35. Id. at 62. 
  The Court in Crawford believed that 
“[t]he Framers would be astounded to learn” that police and other 
government officers could be so intricately involved in the production of 
accusatory statements, and then courts would allow a prosecutor to use such 
hearsay evidence against a defendant at trial without any opportunity for 
 36. Id. at 61. 
 37. Id. at 63 (emphasis added). 
 38. See, e.g., People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo. 2001) (emphasizing that the 
declarant “provided detailed descriptions of the events and conversations,” apparently 
believing that a liar would be incapable of fabricating details). 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the statement, in relevant part, “was fleeting at best,” 
apparently believing that a liar would have provided a greater level of detail). 
 40. See, e.g., Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 372 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). 
 41. See, e.g., State v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, ¶ 12, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918. 
 42. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67. 
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cross-examination.43  Amazingly, perhaps through decades of 
indoctrination, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence had evolved to include 
the assumption that police are “neutral”44 and that judges act in “good 
faith.”45  The problem, however, is that the Framers “would not have been 
content to indulge this assumption.  They knew that judges, like other 
government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of 
the people. . . .  They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial 
hands.”46
II.  CRAWFORD-DAVIS-BRYANT:  THE NEW RULE OF CONFRONTATION 
   
The focus of this Essay—and the “principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause [is] directed”—is hearsay statements that were 
allegedly made to police and other government agents, and then repeated by 
those governmental actors at a defendant’s trial.47
First, the protection of the Confrontation Clause is triggered only when a 
prosecutor attempts to use testimonial hearsay against a defendant.  That is, 
when the hearsay is testimonial, the Confrontation Clause prohibits its use 
at trial.
  The admissibility of this 
type of hearsay is currently governed by Crawford, Davis, and Bryant, 
which were decided over the course of seven years.  The actual rule of 
law—when separated from the Court’s historical diversions, unwarranted 
assumptions, figurative hand-wringing, and justifications—is still 
convoluted. 
48  On the other hand, if the hearsay is nontestimonial, the defendant 
is only protected by the Swiss cheese-like rule against hearsay with its 
thirty or so exceptions.49
 
 43. Id. at 66. 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 67. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 50.  Increasingly, since Crawford and Davis, the line between government-
developed hearsay and other hearsay has blurred, due to law enforcement’s use of surrogate 
interrogators to bypass the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Stevens, Comment, 
Deputy-Doctors:  The Medical Treatment Exception After Davis v. Washington, 43 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 451, 472 (2007) (arguing that to end this abuse, “courts should treat health care 
providers as agents of the police and their interactions with the declarant as police 
interrogation” based on principles of agency law). 
 48. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  Unless, of course, the declarant is truly unavailable 
for live testimony (for example, if he is deceased) and the defendant had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine him (for example, at a previous trial that ended in a mistrial). Id.  Even 
though the unavailability of a witness, combined with a defendant’s prior opportunity for 
cross-examination of that witness, satisfies the Confrontation Clause, it should not.  The 
reason, of course, is that inherent in the right of confrontation is the cross-examination of the 
witness in front of the jury, so that jurors can decide “whether he is worthy of belief.” 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).  This benefit is lost, however, when a 
prosecutor merely reads a transcript of testimony from a prior trial or other proceeding. 
 49. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  Actually, whether the Confrontation Clause provided 
some level of protection against even nontestimonial hearsay was still debated until the 
Court’s decision in Davis. See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶ 55, 697 N.W.2d 811, 
825 n.10 (identifying jurisdictions that retained Roberts in assessing the admissibility of 
nontestimonial statements); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:  Encouraging 
and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 515 (2005). 
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 This, then, leads to the question:  what is testimonial hearsay?  
Testimonial hearsay includes, at a minimum:  (1) “prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial”;50 and (2) 
“[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations.”51  
But what constitutes a police interrogation?  Although the term is well 
settled and broadly defined in the Fifth Amendment context,52
Statements are nontestimonial [and admissible] when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial [and not admissible] when 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.
 the 
definition for Confrontation Clause purposes has been modified to scaled-
back constitutional protection; that is, only some police interrogations will 
produce testimonial hearsay.  More specifically: 
53
But the matter is not yet resolved.  How does the trial judge determine 
the objective, primary purpose of an interrogation?  Diving further down 
into the depths of this new, murky confrontation framework, the rule is that 
the primary purpose depends upon multiple factors possibly including some 
or all of the following:  (1) whether the statement describes “what is 
happening” or “what happened”;
 
54 (2) if the statement describes “what 
happened,” the lapse of time between the incident and the statement;55 (3) 
the nature and timing of the questions that produced the statement;56 (4) the 
level of formality surrounding the interrogation;57 (5) whether the statement 
fits within the “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some 
statements as reliable”;58 (6) the place of the interrogation and whether the 
declarant was protected by police;59
 
 50. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 (7) the type of crime ultimately 
 51. Id. at 52. 
 52. When deciding whether police were required to read a suspect his Miranda rights, 
“interrogation” is defined broadly as express questioning and its functional equivalent. See, 
e.g., State v. Cunningham, 423 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Wis. 1988) (adopting Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)).  Stated differently, an interrogation occurs whenever “the police 
officer’s conduct or speech could reasonably have had the force of a question on the 
suspect.” Id. 
 53. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 54. See id. at 830. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 832. 
 57. See id. at 830. 
 58. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
 59. Davis, 547 U.S. at 831.  While this intuitively seems to be the most important factor 
in determining whether an emergency is ongoing, courts have also disregarded it if it 
interfered with their desired outcome. See infra Part III.C; see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 
1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for ignoring the fact that the declarant 
was surrounded by five police officers who asked “the same battery of questions a fifth 
time . . . to see if any new details helpful to the investigation and eventual prosecution would 
emerge,” and instead finding the emergency to be ongoing, thus making the statements 
nontestimonial and admissible). 
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alleged;60 (8) whether a weapon was involved;61 and (9) the medical 
condition of the alleged victim.62
And the analysis goes on.  The trial judge must also consider whether a 
statement obtained during the course of a single interrogation has morphed 
back and forth between testimonial and nontestimonial, depending on the 
objective, primary purpose of the interrogation at any given point in time.
 
63  
Moreover, because there are two parties to the interrogation—the police and 
the hearsay declarant—there could be two different primary purposes:  one 
of the questioner and one of the declarant.64  Additionally, one or both of 
these individuals could have mixed motives and, therefore, may not even 
have a “primary” purpose.65
III.  GRADING THE COURT’S TESTIMONIAL FRAMEWORK 
  For example, an officer may wish to 
determine whether an emergency is ongoing and to collect statements for 
use in a future prosecution.  Similarly, a declarant may wish to seek police 
protection from an ongoing threat and to report a past crime.  Therefore, the 
statement is to be evaluated objectively, from the perspective or 
perspectives of one or both of the parties, including all of their competing 
motives, at the trial judge’s discretion. 
The Court correctly identified the problems inherent in the Roberts 
reliability framework.  It acknowledged that the right of confrontation 
should not:  (1) be intermingled with the rules of evidence; (2) be tied to a 
pretrial judicial determination of reliability; (3) hinge on a multi-factor 
balancing test; or (4) rely on judicial discretion in its application.66
A.  Welcome Back:  The Return of the Rules of Evidence 
and Pretrial Judicial Determinations of Reliability 
  But the 
Court failed to correct those problems.   Instead, in Crawford, Davis, and 
Bryant, it developed a new confrontation framework that incorporates every 
single one of the flaws that it had denounced. 
For all of its faults, Crawford was very clear about two things.  First, the 
right of confrontation should not vary depending upon “‘the law of 
Evidence for the time being.’”67
 
 60. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that important to the 
“highly context-dependent” inquiry was that the crimes in Davis and Hammon v. Indiana, 
547 U.S. 813 (2006), involved domestic violence).  The result, of course, is that courts will 
have to make factual determinations about, for example, “whether rape and armed robbery 
are more like murder or domestic violence.” Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
  The Confrontation Clause is independent 
 61. Id. at 1158 (majority opinion).  In addition to deciding the relevance of the type of 
crime allegedly being committed, courts will also have to make factual determinations about, 
for example, “whether knives and poison are more like guns or fists.” Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 1159 (majority opinion). 
 63. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
 64. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–64 (2004); see also supra Part I. 
 67. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 3 WIGMORE, supra note 32, at 101). 
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of, and more substantial than, the rule against hearsay and its thirty or so 
exceptions.68  Second, Crawford was clear that hearsay should not be 
admissible against a defendant merely because a judge determined, before 
trial, that it was reliable.69
Given these two very clear mandates of Crawford, it is unlikely that 
anyone could have predicted what the Court would do next.  While authors 
were (understandably) contemplating Crawford’s separation of the 
Confrontation Clause from the rule against hearsay,
 
70 the Court was 
actually reversing its course.  In Bryant, the Court reunited the Constitution 
with the rules of evidence, and reinstituted pretrial judicial reliability 
determinations.  Specifically, the Court stated that when determining the 
objective, primary purpose of an interrogation—which, in turn, determines 
whether the interrogation produced testimonial or nontestimonial hearsay 
statements—the “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some 
statements as reliable, will be relevant.”71
 [t]his logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance exception 
in hearsay law.  Statements “relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition,” . . . are considered reliable because the declarant, in 
the excitement, presumably cannot form a falsehood. . . .  An ongoing 
emergency has a similar effect of focusing an individual’s attention on 
responding to the emergency.
  The Court reasoned that 
72
Ignore, for a moment, that because the declarant is necessarily absent 
from trial (or there would not be a confrontation issue in the first place), the 
police can simply say that the declarant appeared excited—or fearful, or 
whatever buzzword a judge wants to hear—thus rendering the hearsay 
nontestimonial and admissible.
 
73  After all, it is this type of police-created 
hearsay that is “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed.”74
 
 68. See supra Part I.A. 
  Also ignore that any person who makes a false allegation to the 
police would also make himself appear to be “under the stress of 
excitement” from the fabricated event.  Finally, ignore that even if genuine 
stress and excitement did somehow conspire to prevent a person from 
 69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown 
of a Union:  Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 
185 (2004). 
 71. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (emphases added). 
 72. Id. at 1157 (emphases added) (citations omitted). 
 73. After Crawford was decided, I demonstrated how routinely and easily the police do 
this.  For example, to squeeze an absent declarant’s statement into the excited utterance 
hearsay exception, the prosecutor merely asks the officer to “describe [the declarant’s] 
demeanor when she gave the statement to you,” and the officer need only reply, “‘Um, rather 
excited.’” Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford v. 
Washington:  Defining “Testimonial,” 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 550 (2006) 
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Searcy, 2006 WI App 8, ¶ 11, 709 N.W.2d 497, 
502).  Based on this, the hearsay exception is deemed satisfied, and the statement is then 
admissible. Id. 
 74. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
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lying—an untested idea developed in the eighteenth century to admit the 
hearsay of child declarants75—the Court’s holding still says nothing about 
hearsay where the declarant was honestly mistaken or delusional; such 
statements continue to go uncross-examined.  Even ignoring these three 
defects in the Court’s reasoning, we are still left with the underlying, 
fundamental problem that has plagued the Court since Roberts:  “reliability 
continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where 
emergencies and faux emergencies are concerned.”76
In fact, despite all of its bravado in Crawford, the Court changed nothing 
of substance, and only slightly modified the form of its analysis by adding 
an intermediate layer.  That is, under Roberts, a trial judge would use the 
rules of evidence to find a hearsay statement to be reliable and therefore 
admissible without any cross-examination.  Now, under Crawford-Davis-
Bryant, a trial judge uses the rules of evidence to find a hearsay statement 
reliable, and therefore nontestimonial, and therefore admissible without any 
cross-examination.  Despite this newly added intermediate step, however, 
the same Sixth Amendment problem remains.
 
77
So, with respect to the use of hearsay rules and pretrial determinations of 
reliability, the Court failed to correct the problems of Roberts.  
Unfortunately, however, this was just the beginning of the Court’s failures.  
As the next sections illustrate, the Court also refused to replace Roberts’s 
multi-factor balancing test and neglected to replace, or even constrain, 
Roberts’s use of judicial discretion. 
 
B.  Same Old Song and Dance:  Another Multi-factor Balancing Test Leads 
to Continued Unpredictability 
While many were surprised that the Supreme Court chose to reunite the 
Confrontation Clause with the rules of evidence and resuscitate the pretrial 
determination of reliability, the Court’s other failures were both predictable 
and predicted. 
As discussed in Part I, the Crawford Court condemned the multi-factor 
reliability test of Roberts for being “[v]ague,”78 “malleable,”79 and 
“entirely subjective,”80 thus leading to its wild “unpredictability,”81
 
 75. See John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions:  Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to 
Psychological Science, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 3, 4.  The idea underlying 
the excited utterance exception—“that trauma momentarily stills the capacity or motivation 
to lie”—is “unsupported by empirical evidence.” Id. at 8. 
 even 
when applied in good faith.  However, as discussed in Part II, the Court 
then adopted an equally vague, malleable, subjective, multi-factor test in 
Crawford-Davis-Bryant, which could only lead to equally unpredictable 
results. 
 76. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 77. See supra text accompanying note 35.   
 78. Id. at 68. 
 79. Id. at 60. 
 80. Id. at 63. 
 81. Id. 
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This is not hindsight criticism; shortly after Crawford was decided, I 
warned that the Court’s new framework was nothing more than “a facts-
and-circumstances analysis to determine if the proffered hearsay falls 
within [the] definition [of testimonial].”82  “Once again, hearsay would be 
admitted into evidence as the result of judges applying vague standards, but 
this time under a different label:  testimonial rather than reliable.”83  And, 
of course, “inconsistent and unpredictable rulings also remain.”84
As demonstrated in Part I.C, under the Roberts test one court would find 
hearsay reliable because the declarant was in custody when he made the 
statement; another court would find hearsay reliable because the declarant 
was not in custody when he made the statement.
  It was 
not long before this early prediction was proven correct by simply 
comparing the unpredictability of lower courts’ Roberts decisions with the 
unpredictability of their post-Crawford decisions. 
85  Similarly, one court 
would find hearsay reliable because it was detailed; another court would 
find hearsay reliable because it was not detailed.86
But this Roberts unpredictability was not limited to an inter-court 
analysis; intra-court analyses would reveal similar results.  For example, 
one court found hearsay reliable because the statement was made 
immediately after the criminal episode;
 
87 however, in a case only four 
months earlier, that same court found hearsay reliable because the statement 
was made a full two years after the criminal episode.88
In Crawford, the Court even cited the case’s own procedural history as a 
“self-contained demonstration of Roberts’ unpredictable and inconsistent 
application.”
 
89  First, the state trial court found the hearsay reliable; then the 
state appellate court reversed the trial court, finding the hearsay unreliable; 
then the state supreme court reversed the appellate court, finding the 
hearsay reliable; and finally, the U.S. Supreme Court, had it not overruled 
the Roberts multi-factor balancing test, would have reversed the state 
supreme court “by simply reweighing the ‘reliability factors’ under Roberts 
and finding that [the declarant’s] statement falls short.”90
 
 82. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 
 
73, at 540; see also Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford 
Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 70 (2005) 
(“Crawford is only another balancing test, with the balancing now being carried out in 
deciding whether any statement should be labeled testimonial.”). 
 83. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 541. 
 84. Id.; see also Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims:  Applying the 
“Testimonial Statements” Test in Crawford v. Washington, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
387, 398 (2005) (noting that it is “apparent that the Supreme Court’s refusal to articulate a 
definition of ‘testimonial statements’ has resulted in irreconcilable evidentiary rulings”). 
 85. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 87. People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo. 2001) (noting that the statement was 
timely, and apparently believing that memories are sharpest shortly after the incident). 
 88. Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 315–16 (Colo. 2001) (finding it impressive that the 
statement was delayed, apparently believing that memories get sharper as time passes). 
 89. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004). 
 90. Id. at 67. 
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There is no question that Roberts produced wildly inconsistent results; 
this was, after all, one of the reasons the Court tried to change its course in 
Crawford.  However, the post-Crawford cases told a similar story.  The 
factors in the multi-factor balancing test changed—instead of determining 
whether hearsay was reliable, courts were now looking to a different set of 
factors to determine, for example, whether there was an ongoing emergency 
at the time of the statement—but the unpredictable results remained the 
same. 
For example, Davis held that when a suspect leaves the scene of a 
domestic violence incident, the emergency has ended.91  This is because the 
scope of potential danger in a domestic violence incident is very narrow 
relative to non-domestic crimes, and is nearly always limited to the 
domestic partner.92  Consequently, with no ongoing emergency, all 
subsequent statements by the alleged victim-declarant to the police are 
testimonial, and therefore not admissible.  Conversely, a Minnesota 
appellate court held that when a suspect leaves the scene of a domestic 
violence incident, the emergency is still ongoing.93  This is because the 
alleged domestic abuser could, at least hypothetically, decide to attack 
other, unrelated parties.94
Interestingly, both courts are wrong.  The Minnesota court is stretching to 
create an ongoing emergency where none exists.  The Supreme Court is off 
base as well because statistics show that, in addition to the common 
domestic dispute, even non-domestic homicides have a very narrow scope 
of potential danger:  “almost 90 percent of murders involve a single 
victim.”
  Consequently, because the (faux) emergency is 
still ongoing, all subsequent statements by the alleged victim-declarant to 
the police are nontestimonial, and therefore admissible. 
95  This means that once the suspect has left the scene, and the 
police have responded and are safely surrounding the alleged victim, the 
emergency has ended.96
 
 91. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (“In this case, for example, after 
the operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the 
emergency appears to have ended (when [the defendant] drove away from the premises).”). 
  However, the reason the Supreme Court tried to 
distinguish the facts of Bryant—the non-domestic murder case it was 
deciding—from the facts of Davis—a domestic violence case it had already 
decided—is that it had backed itself into a corner with its Davis decision.  
And it had to somehow escape this corner to find that the declarant’s 
 92. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1158 (2011) (“Domestic violence cases 
like Davis and Hammon often have a narrower zone of potential victims than cases involving 
threats to public safety.”). 
 93. See State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 641–42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 94. See id. (“We conclude that the ‘ongoing emergency’ referred to in Davis . . . need 
not be limited to the complainant’s predicament or the location where she is questioned by 
police.”). 
 95. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 2009 FBI homicide data). 
 96. See id. at 1172–73 (“Because almost 90 percent of murders involve a single victim, 
it is much more likely—indeed, I think it certain—that the officers viewed their encounter 
with [the declarant] for what it was:  an investigation into a past crime with no ongoing or 
immediate consequences.”). 
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statement in Bryant was made during an ongoing emergency.97  Thus, it 
crafted a distinction between the two types of crimes.98
But this only touches the surface of the post-Crawford inconsistencies.  
In a different class of police-generated hearsay, courts are often called upon 
to determine whether an alleged victim’s hearsay statement to a medical 
professional was made for a medical diagnosis—which would make it 
nontestimonial and therefore admissible—or a criminal prosecution—which 
would make it testimonial and therefore inadmissible.  In this situation, one 
court found a declarant’s statement to a government nurse (and mandatory 
reporter) to be nontestimonial, and therefore admissible, because a police 
officer first took a statement from the declarant and then brought her to the 
government nurse to repeat the statement.
 
99  However, a different court also 
found this type of hearsay to be nontestimonial, and therefore admissible, 
but so found because a police officer purposely avoided taking a statement 
from the declarant, and instead sent her directly to the government nurse to 
make her allegation.100
On an intra-court basis, even the Supreme Court has produced 
unpredictable and inconsistent results within its own decisions; that is, 
sometimes it reaches completely opposite conclusions despite nearly 
identical sets of facts.  For example, in Davis it found that a statement was 
testimonial, and therefore not admissible, because the declarant described 
past events, rather than an ongoing incident, to police.  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the police were actually investigating a past crime for later 
criminal prosecution.
 
101  In Bryant, however, the Court found that a 
statement was nontestimonial, and therefore admissible, even though this 
particular declarant also described past events, rather than an ongoing 
incident, to police.102  The police even admitted that their purpose for 
questioning the declarant was to “find out who did this, period.”103  Despite 
this, the Court decided that the police officer’s purpose was not to 
investigate a past crime for later criminal prosecution because the police 
officer did not specifically say to the declarant, “Tell us who did this to you 
so that we can arrest and prosecute them.”104
 
 97. See infra notes 
  Once the nontestimonial label 
was affixed to the statement, of course, it was admissible. 
146–47 and accompanying text. 
 98. This distinction also opened up Pandora’s Box:  with the many hundreds of different 
types of crimes that each state legislature has created, courts will now have to make 
judgments about whether, for example, “rape and armed robbery are more like murder or 
domestic violence.” Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. See State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 834, at ¶ 46. 
 100. See In re A.J.A., No. A06-479, 2006 WL 2474267, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 
2006). 
 101. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006) (finding statements testimonial 
because police officers were “not seeking to determine . . . ‘what is happening,’ but rather 
‘what happened’”). 
 102. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011). 
 103. Id. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted). 
 104. Id. at 1161 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  The Court essentially provided the 
police with a blueprint of how to handle an interrogation, including what not to say, so that 
any statements produced in that interrogation will be labeled nontestimonial, and will 
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These ongoing, highly inconsistent results do not happen by chance; as 
discussed above, they happen because the Court replaced one subjective, 
malleable, factor-laden standard with another subjective, malleable, factor-
laden standard.  As this section demonstrates, and as Justice Scalia now 
admits, the nine-factor balancing test of Crawford-Davis-Bryant is “no 
better than the nine-factor balancing test” of Roberts.105
The Court first criticized the Roberts reliability test for allowing judges 
to weigh “countless factors”
 
106 in their analysis and for leaving “too much 
discretion in judicial hands.”107  Then, only seven years later, it criticized 
the Supreme Court of Michigan for not recognizing that the new testimonial 
standard of Crawford-Davis-Bryant is “a highly context-dependant 
inquiry”108 in which judges should not be “unjustifiably restrained from 
consulting all relevant information.”109
Does the Court not realize that having a balancing test with “countless 
factors” is the same as making “a highly context-dependent inquiry”?
 
110  
Either test violates the Confrontation Clause.  Justice Thomas’s dissents in 
both Davis and Bryant acknowledged what I predicted shortly after 
Crawford:  replacing one open-ended balancing test with another will 
continue to produce the same unpredictable results.111  Furthermore, despite 
the Court’s claim that the complexity of its newest multi-factor balancing 
test increases accuracy,112 the new framework is, at best, “‘an exercise in 
fiction.’”113
 
therefore be admissible.  It is not likely that the police needed this Court-created blueprint, 
however, as they are quite skilled at adapting their practices to bypass constitutional 
protections. See, e.g., Cicchini & Rust, supra note 
  And, as the next section demonstrates, it is, at worst, a tool for 
73, at 545–51 (explaining the adaptability 
of police practices and demonstrating the phenomenon in numerous contexts). 
 105. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 106. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
 107. Id. at 67. 
 108. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 (majority opinion). 
 109. Id. at 1162. 
 110. Id. at 1158.  Justice Scalia now matter-of-factly admits, “It can be said, of course, 
that under Crawford analysis of whether a statement is testimonial requires consideration of 
all the circumstances, and so is also something of a multifactor balancing test.” Id. at 1176 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 111. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 541. 
 112. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (majority opinion) (criticizing the dissent by stating 
that “we, at least, are unwilling to sacrifice accuracy for simplicity”). 
 113. Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
839 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  By the time of Davis, 
Justice Thomas realized the folly in the Court’s new framework, but he still failed to 
appreciate the nature of the right of confrontation.  That is, he wrote in his Bryant 
concurrence that the Court’s decision “illustrates the uncertainty that this test creates for law 
enforcement.” Id.  There are two problems with this statement.  First, the Confrontation 
Clause is a trial right and the Court’s decisions should not, in any way, affect law 
enforcement practices.  Second, as discussed in the next section, the Court’s decisions do 
affect law enforcement testimony in pretrial hearings.  However, there is nothing “uncertain” 
about what law enforcement has to do.  They have the very clear and simple task of 
testifying that they were concerned for somebody’s safety—whether their own, the 
declarant’s, or even the general public’s—to satisfy the ongoing emergency test. See infra 
Part III.C.  The police are well schooled in this type of manipulation, especially in the Fourth 
Amendment context. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” 
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judges to abuse their already overly broad discretion that Crawford-Davis-
Bryant was supposed to constrain. 
C.  The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:  
Judicial Discretion Under a Different Label 
Another failure of Crawford-Davis-Bryant that was predictable and 
predicted is closely related to the Court’s love of multi-factor balancing 
tests:  the new testimonial framework has completely failed to eliminate, or 
even constrain, judicial discretion.114  Specifically, under Roberts, when the 
police are involved in the creation of accusatory statements, and the 
declarant of those statements is not available for trial, the police—with the 
help of the prosecutor and the complicity of the judge—simply reconstruct 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the statement so that 
it satisfies the reliability test.115
But the Court’s new framework relies just as heavily on judicial 
discretion, and admits police-created hearsay just as easily.  The only 
difference is that now, the police—again with the help of the prosecutor and 
the complicity of the judge—simply reconstruct the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement so that it is labeled nontestimonial.  
And, because Bryant held that one of the factors that makes a statement 
nontestimonial is whether the judge finds it to be reliable,
 
116
After Crawford, I demonstrated how easily police and prosecutors were 
bypassing the Court’s new testimonial framework, and warned that judicial 
discretion was not being constrained as intended.  Once the police and 
prosecutors created their desired set of facts surrounding the hearsay 
statement, trial judges blindly accepted their version of events.  I further 
wrote that: 
 nothing has 
really changed since the days of Roberts. 
Under Crawford, therefore, the need for judicial discretion has not been 
eliminated, but merely transferred from one determinative issue—whether 
the hearsay is reliable—to another determinative issue—whether the 
hearsay is testimonial.  Trial judges, who “could not always be trusted to 
safeguard the rights of the people,” are now deciding which hearsay is 
testimonial and must be excluded, and which hearsay is non-testimonial 
and therefore may be admitted.  The end result, therefore, is the same as it 
was under Roberts:  the admission of hearsay is still based on judicial 
discretion, untested by cross-examination.117
 
as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie:  A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 233, 249 (1998) (discussing how police perjury designed to circumvent the Fourth 
Amendment “is identical from one case to another”). 
 
 114. See supra Part I.D. 
 115. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 548. 
 116. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (majority opinion) (explaining that when deciding the 
primary purpose of an interrogation, which in turn dictates a statement’s status as testimonial 
or nontestimonial, “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as 
reliable, will be relevant”); see also supra Part III.A. 
 117. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 540.  Some others provided an early warning of 
this as well. See, e.g., David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat:  Confronting Judicial 
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Unfortunately, this and similar criticisms fell on deaf ears as the Court 
continued down the path of its new testimonial framework when it decided 
Davis.  Then, shortly after Davis, I again wrote about the continued abuse 
of judicial discretion under the testimonial framework.118  For example, 
with respect to expanding the ongoing emergency, even in cases where an 
allegedly violent incident had ended, and the alleged victim-declarant was 
safely in the presence of police, courts would still deem the emergency to 
be “ongoing.”119  How?  “If situations can be upgraded to ongoing 
emergencies simply because a defendant might commit an unspecified 
crime at some unspecified time in the future against an unspecified victim, 
then every situation will be automatically transformed into an ongoing 
emergency.”120
Now, several years later, Justice Scalia realizes this precise point.  In his 
Bryant dissent he writes that, with regard to the ongoing emergency, the 
Court’s open-ended balancing test created too much room for “judicial 
mischief.”
  The result is that the hearsay statement will be labeled as 
nontestimonial, and will therefore be admissible. 
121  Because the police can always make a claim that there is a 
public threat, “a defendant will have no constitutionally protected right to 
exclude the uncross-examined testimony of such witnesses.”122  And, just 
as I had warned years earlier that the means by which a court could expand 
the ongoing emergency would be limited only by “judicial imagination and 
creativity,”123 Scalia now criticizes his fellow justices for their “active 
imagination” in finding an ongoing emergency where none exists.124
Similarly, and also shortly after Davis, I illustrated how courts were 
distorting the primary purpose test.  For example, even when an alleged 
victim-declarant was specifically told, before making a statement, that the 
  This 
critique is remarkable, coming from the Justice who set it all in motion 
when he authored the Crawford opinion, and perpetuated it with Davis. 
 
Bias in Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 995, 1005 (2005) (describing the “urgency, on [one] court’s part, to establish that 
Crawford does not impose an obstacle” to victimless prosecutions and discussing “judges’ 
predisposition to believe the prosecution’s version of domestic assaults”); Moody, supra 
note 84, at 394 (“[W]hen courts stubbornly insist on admitting hearsay evidence that they 
believe should be admitted despite Crawford’s exclusion of testimonial evidence, they must 
creatively circumvent the Crawford test with inventive evidentiary rulings.”). 
 118. See Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion:  How Courts Circumvent the 
Confrontation Clause Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 767 (2008) 
(“Repeatedly, courts completely distort the Clause—as interpreted in Crawford and Davis—
in order to accomplish a predetermined goal of admitting hearsay evidence against 
defendants.”). 
 119. Id. at 768–70. 
 120. Id. at 770; see also Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford:  The Confrontation Clause 
After Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
11, 12 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/fine.pdf (“When 
determining the ‘primary purpose’ of questioning, it will be difficult for courts to ignore an 
officer’s claim that he believed the emergency to be ongoing when he questioned the 
declarant.”). 
 121. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 1173. 
 123. Cicchini, supra note 118, at 767. 
 124. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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statement would be used in “the investigation and prosecution of this 
crime,” courts would still find that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
was not to prove past events for later criminal prosecution.125  How?  By 
pure speculation that, despite the clear warning and purpose of the 
interrogator, the declarant could still (somehow) have imagined a different 
purpose for the statement.126  And, with nothing more than this judicial 
slight-of-hand, the hearsay statement will be labeled nontestimonial, and 
will therefore be admissible.  In light of cases like this, it was obvious that 
courts could simply “distort the Clause . . . in order to accomplish a 
predetermined goal of admitting hearsay evidence against defendants.”127
Justice Scalia now appreciates this issue as well.  In his Bryant dissent, 
he writes that, regarding the primary purpose test, courts now have the 
discretion “to sort through two sets of mixed motives to determine the 
primary purpose of an interrogation.”
 
128
If the defendant “deserves” to go to jail, then a court can focus on 
whatever perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay non-
testimonial.  And when all else fails, a court can mix-and-match 
perspectives [of the declarant and the police officer] to reach its desired 
outcome.  Unfortunately, under this malleable approach “the guarantee of 
confrontation is no guarantee at all.”
  Specifically, he concedes that: 
129
This continued use (and abuse) of judicial discretion did not happen by 
chance; instead, it happened because the Court adopted a framework where, 
instead of deciding whether a statement is reliable, trial judges make an 
equally subjective determination of whether a statement is testimonial.  In 
both situations, their finding is a prerequisite for the admissibility of the 
declarant’s statement.  Furthermore, the Crawford-Davis-Bryant framework 
actually requires even more judicial discretion than Roberts.  That is, trial 
judges not only have to decide the primary purpose of an interrogation—
which determines whether the statement is testimonial—but they first have 
to decide whether the declarant’s or police officer’s perspective should be 
used,
 
130 whether there is a primary purpose at all,131 and, if so, whether the 
primary purpose of one or both parties changed at any point during the 
interrogation.132
 
 125. See Cicchini, supra note 
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The Court should have realized, as some of us did, that its initial 
Crawford framework would be no better than Roberts at constraining 
judicial discretion.  And although the Court did not realize it then, it should 
have realized it by reading some of the lower courts’ post-Crawford 
decisions before it decided Davis—a case in which the Court expanded 
judicial discretion.  Or it should have finally realized it, as Justice Scalia 
did, by reading some of the lower courts’ post-Davis decisions before it 
decided Bryant—a case in which, despite overwhelming evidence that 
lower courts continued to abuse their discretion, the Court continued to 
expand its multi-factor testimonial framework and give judges even more 
discretion. 
IV.  THE SOLUTION:  A TRIAL-BASED APPROACH 
TO TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
The solution to the problem was (and is) amazingly simple.  The inquiry 
should not be on the facts and circumstances of how a hearsay statement 
was allegedly made—for example, where an officer testifies, after the fact, 
that the declarant appeared excited and fearful for his safety.  Nor should it 
be on how a hearsay statement was allegedly collected—for example, 
where an officer testifies that he asked questions to address an ongoing 
emergency, rather than to investigate a past crime.133  In a Confrontation 
Clause scenario, the details of the making or taking of a statement are only 
available months or years later through the interrogating officer, and are 
subject to his memory and manipulation; after all, such statements are 
almost never recorded and they are rarely witnessed by anyone other than 
the police.134
To acknowledge, as the Crawford Court did, that police-developed 
hearsay evidence is “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause 
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was directed,”135 and then to rely on the police officer’s post-incident 
reconstruction of events (after he consults with the prosecutor, no less) to 
determine whether the hearsay is nontestimonial and therefore admissible, 
is absurd.  Rather, the proper inquiry to determine whether a statement is 
testimonial involves the statement’s use at trial.136
the term testimonial should be defined as all accusatory hearsay, i.e., 
hearsay that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the 
identification of the defendant.  To adopt a narrower definition . . . would 
necessarily require a tremendous amount of judicial discretion under a 
facts-and-circumstances analysis.
  This inquiry is not only 
more relevant than how the statement was made or obtained, but is also 
immune from manipulation by police, prosecutors, and even judges.  After 
Crawford, I wrote that 
137
The Court comes frustratingly close to this realization on a number of 
occasions.  For example, in Davis, the Court analyzed whether the hearsay 
statement was “‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial,” but, 
because of the facts and circumstances surrounding the statement’s making, 
concluded that it was not.
 
138  Similarly, in Bryant, the Court asked the same 
question, and the majority came to the same conclusion.  Justice Scalia, 
however, felt that because the hearsay statement was made in response to 
“structured questioning,” it was a “‘weaker substitute[] for live testimony at 
trial.’”139
While Scalia reaches the right conclusion, he misses the underlying 
point:  if the prosecutor uses a hearsay statement at trial, and that statement 
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“tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the identification 
of the defendant,”140
Whether something is a substitute for live testimony at trial depends on 
what happens in the courtroom.  It is irrelevant for purposes of the 
testimonial determination (which, in turn, determines admissibility) that a 
police officer says that when he questioned the declarant, the declarant was 
injured or appeared excited or fearful.  It is also irrelevant that the police 
officer says that his purpose when questioning the declarant was to inquire 
whether the declarant feared a future attack, and not to collect evidence of a 
past crime.  Even if “the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the 
primary purpose of resolving [an] emergency is presumably significantly 
diminished,”
 then it is a substitute for live testimony at trial.  For 
example, if a declarant tells the police that “the defendant, John Doe, 
punched me,” and the police later repeat that statement at John Doe’s trial 
to prove either the identity of the defendant or any element of the crime 
charged, then it is a weaker substitute—or, depending on the appearance 
and credibility of the absent accuser, a stronger substitute—for live 
testimony at trial. 
141
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed 
in a particular manner:  by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.  
The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of 
reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about 
how reliability can best be determined.
 the Confrontation Clause is still very clear: 
142
Until the Court heeds its own words and focuses on the hearsay’s use at 
trial, instead of the manner in which the police say the statement was given 
or taken, we might as well go back to the Roberts reliability framework. 
 
CONCLUSION:  LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
The Supreme Court should not completely replace a framework—here, 
the Roberts reliability framework—with another framework that fails to 
define its key term—here, the Crawford framework and the term 
testimonial.  That is, the Court should not “leave for another day any effort 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”143
 
 140. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 
  If the Court 
cannot decide on a definition for the framework’s key term, then the 
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 141. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157. 
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if their casual nature (at the time of their making) were to somehow remove them from the 
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be used to convict a defendant of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 143. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
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uncertainty it creates is unlikely to be “interim” in nature, as it had 
hoped.144
Nor should the Court speculate or meander when writing decisions.  It 
should write less.  For example, in Davis, the Court wrote the following 
with regard to defining an ongoing emergency:  “In this case, for example, 
after the operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of 
the moment, the emergency appears to have ended when Davis drove away 
from the premises.”
  If a complete framework cannot be implemented, then the Court 
should not implement a new framework at all, especially not one that relies 
on the very thing—judicial discretion—that it was supposedly trying to 
constrain. 
145  But then, when the Michigan court reached the 
same conclusion in Bryant, the Supreme Court had to find a way to 
abandon its earlier position in Davis.  To do so, the Court chastised the 
Michigan court for misinterpreting Davis, and then craftily took the position 
that it had “merely assumed . . . without deciding” that the emergency in 
Davis had ended when Davis left the premises.146
But this does not ring true.  The Court in Davis did not “assume” 
anything; instead, it reached its own conclusion and found that the 
emergency had ended.
 
147
Finally, the Court should not blame lower courts for the problems created 
by its decisions.  For example, after the Michigan court followed Davis to 
the letter, the Supreme Court continually referred to the lower court’s 
“misunderstanding”
  Furthermore, if the Court knows in advance 
which parts of its decision are to be taken seriously and which parts are to 
be disregarded, then it simply should not write the parts that it wants to be 
disregarded.  Alternatively, if the Court claims that the distinction is one of 
“holding” versus “dicta,” then the Court is selectively interpreting its own 
cases so narrowly that they would have absolutely no applicability beyond 
the precise set of facts in any particular case; this is not the role of a 
nation’s highest court. 
148 of Davis, and its “fail[ure] to appreciate”149 and its 
“failure to focus”150 on the Court’s language.  The Court also stated that, 
because the lower court “erroneously read”151 Davis, it would now “provide 
additional clarification with regard to what Davis meant,”152
What the Court should have done is simply admit that it erred in 
implementing another fact-intensive framework that relied almost 
exclusively on judicial discretion, and that five justices
 as if the lower 
court simply was not capable of grasping the Court’s message the first time. 
153
 
 144. See id. at 68 n.10. 
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 146. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158. 
 147. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
 148. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160. 
 149. Id. at 1158. 
 150. Id. at 1159. 
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 152. Id. at 1156. 
 153. Justices Scalia and Ginsburg dissented, Justice Kagan took no part in the decision, 
and, although Justice Thomas concurred in the Court’s ultimate judgment, he did so for 
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exercised their own discretion, under these particular facts, to reach a 
different conclusion than the lower court.  Instead, the Court “resurrect[ed] 
Roberts by a thousand unprincipled distinctions without ever explicitly 
overruling Crawford[.]  After all, honestly overruling Crawford would 
destroy the illusion of judicial minimalism and restraint.”154
It is unlikely that the Court will follow these—or any—lessons from the 
“train wreck” it has made of the Confrontation Clause.
 
155  But all is not lost 
for the right of confrontation.  The individual states should, under their own 
state constitutions, define testimonial as “all accusatory hearsay, i.e., 
hearsay that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the 
identification of the defendant.”156
Fortunately, individual states are not constrained “by the Supreme Court 
of the United States if it is the judgment of [a state] that the Constitution of 
[the state] and the laws of [the] state require that greater protection of 
citizens’ liberties ought to be afforded.”
 
157  That is, even the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions “do not bind the individual state’s power to mold higher 
standards under their respective state constitutions.”158
With this course of action the right of confrontation can be restored, and 
the individual states can do what the Court could not:  “[I]nterpret the 
Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial 
discretion.”
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